Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional Rule of Reason Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief by Libow, Daryl A.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 71
Issue 3 March 1986 Article 5
Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional Rule
of Reason Applied to Transnational Injunctive
Relief
Daryl A. Libow
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daryl A. Libow, Laker Antitrust Litigation: The Jurisdictional Rule of Reason Applied to Transnational Injunctive Relief, 71 Cornell L. Rev.
645 (1986)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol71/iss3/5
THE LAKER ANTITRUST LITIGATION: THE
JURISDICTIONAL "RULE OF REASON" APPLIED
TO TRANSNATIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
Laker Airlines' 1982 lawsuit against several American and Euro-
pean rivals alleging violations of the Clayton Act sharply brought
into focus the problems raised by extraterritorial application of
American antitrust laws. In such cases foreign courts frequently
have jurisdiction over the same parties and issues involved in the
United States litigation, and concurrent assertions ofjurisdiction by
both the United States and foreign courts often result in dispute. In
the Laker litigation, the United States and British courts' failure to
resolve their jurisdictional conflict forced courts on both sides of the
Atlantic to resort to the use of an extraordinary equitable remedy:
the transnational antisuit injunction.
Twice during the course of its antitrust litigation, Laker Airlines
requested United States courts to enjoin named defendants in its
United States suit from initiating foreign proceedings designed to
vitiate the jurisdiction of United States courts. Traditionally, United
States courts have relied on general principles of comity to guide
their discretion in enjoining suits in foreign courts, once the tradi-
tional requirements for injunctive relief have been satisfied. The
federal courts in the Laker litigation, however, established new pre-
cedent by expressly engaging in a more structured weighing of spe-
cific foreign interests against competing United States interests.
The method of analysis used by the Laker courts seems to closely
parallel the jurisdictional rule of reason, an approach applied fre-
quently by courts to the threshold question of whether to assert ju-
risdiction. The Laker courts appear to be the first to expressly apply
the rule of reason to the question of whether to grant a transna-
tional antisuit injunction.
Part I of this Note examines the doctrinal evolution of the juris-
dictional rule of reason and explains why it is a test more sensitive to
the interests of foreign nations than traditional principles of comity.
Part I also delineates the traditional parameters of the proper use of
transnational antisuit injunctions and examines the efficacy of the
traditional comity doctrine as a check on a court's power to issue
such injunctions. Part II traces the development of the Laker litiga-
tion and reviews the decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirming the District Court's
issuance of an injunction against foreign defendants seeking relief in
645
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
British courts. Additionally, Part II reviews the subsequent decision
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia not
to further enjoin the British defendants from petitioning their own
government for redress. Part III analyzes Judge Wilkey's opinion
for the D.C. Circuit and concludes that it properly refines the tradi-
tional equitable doctrine governing the issuance of antisuit injunc-
tions and, by considering the interests of the competing foreign
forum, takes an important step toward adopting the jurisdictional
rule of reason in the context of transnational injunctive relief. Part
III also reviews Judge Greene's subsequent District Court decision
and concludes that his express use of the rule of reason is a positive
development in the use of transnational antisuit injunctions. Fi-
nally, the Note explores the benefits derived from the use of a rule




In the course of a suit stemming from the extraterritorial appli-
cation of American law, a United States court first has to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over any foreign parties involved. Ifjuris-
diction exists, a party may then request the court to enjoin the for-
eign parties from suing in other countries, and the court must then
decide if such an injunction is proper. A court's decisions to assert
jurisdiction and to issue a transnational antisuit injunction are simi-
lar in that both tread heavily on the interests of foreign nations.
However, the United States courts have traditionally adopted differ-
ent rules to govern the making of each of these decisions.
A. The Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Rule of Reason
Assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction by the United States
courts resulting from extraterritorial application of American law
often conflict with the interests of foreign nations.' Until recently,
United States courts embraced expansive jurisdictional doctrines,
asserting jurisdiction over all foreign activity that "affected" Ameri-
can commerce.2 Considerations of comity have since led to the de-
velopment of a judicial doctrine designed to assist courts in
determining the advisability and reasonableness of extraterritorial
exercises of jurisdiction.3 This doctrine, which has become known
as the jurisdictional "rule of reason," 4 is basically a balancing-of-
I See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
4 Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). The
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interests test that requires courts to weigh the importance of the
United States interests involved in an extraterritorial assertion ofju-
risdiction against competing foreign interests.5 The jurisdictional
rule of reason is distinguishable from general principles of comity. 6
The jurisdictional rule of reason evolved in reaction to the nu-
merous and intense transnational judicial conflicts generated by the
extraterritorial enforcement of United States antitrust law.7 Prior to
the development of the rule of reason, American courts followed the
rule established in United States v. Aluminum Corporation of America (AL-
COA):8 the Sherman Act applies to wholly foreign activity transpir-
ing entirely outside the United States if it affects American
commerce, and United States courts have jurisdiction over foreign
parties engaged in this activity.9 The development of the ALCOA
"effects" test, coupled with the Sherman Act's express application
to commerce with foreign nations, 10 permitted almost limitless ex-
traterritorial application of American law and assertion of United
States jurisdiction, much to the resentment and disapproval of the
international community. 1
In the mid 1970s, courts began to develop a doctrine that lim-
ited the extraterritorial reach of their jurisdiction. 12 The seminal
court acknowledged that the phrase was borrowed from Professor Kingman Brewster.
See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1985).
5 See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
7 For an excellent overview of the problem, see D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON,
NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
18-45 (1982); see also Picciotto,Jurisdictional Conflicts, International Law and the International
State System, 11 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 11, 14-15 (1983); Note, The Use of Interest Analysis in the
Extraterritorial Application of the United States Antitrust Law, 16 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 147-55
(1983).
8 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
9 Id. at 44344.
10 Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . . with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
11 See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 18-41, 68-80; Petite &
Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 37
Bus. LAW. 697-715 (1982); Note, supra note 7, at 163-65. Many nations responded to
United States "insensitivity" by enacting "blocking" legislation aimed at vitiating United
States jurisdiction, frustrating pretrial discovery, and hampering efforts to enforce do-
mestic judgments.
More than a dozen states have passed such blocking statutes, many of which are
reproduced in their entirety and accompanied by brief analysis in A. LOWE, EXTRATERRI-
TORIALJURISDICTION (1983). See also Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Petite & Styles, supra,
at 697-715; Comment, Foreign Blocking Enforcement of American Antitrust Law, 1981 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 945, 958-74. Several bills recently introduced in Congress would create an
American "blocking" statute. See 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 426-427 (1983).
12 This shift in judicial policy coincided with the shift in executive policy to avoid
conflicts with other nations that result from a mechanical and overly expansive applica-
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decision confronting the defects and parochialism of the ALCOA ef-
fects test, and expressly considering the interests of the foreign fo-
rum, was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.13 In Timberlane an
Oregon partnership that milled and exported lumber from Hondu-
ras alleged that the Bank of America conspired with others to shut
down its milling operation and that its resulting inability to export
Honduran lumber to the United States harmed American com-
merce. 14 The court found that a mere application of the effects test
was "incomplete" and insensitive because it "fail[ed] to consider the
other nation's interests" or "take into account the full nature of the
relationship between the actors and this country." 15
In lieu of the effects test, the Ninth Circuit, taking guidance
from the 1965 Restatement of Foreign Relations, '6 ruled that after find-
ing a restraint upon United States commerce significant enough in
its effect to be cognizable under the Sherman Act, a court should
review a long list of factors based on comity and fairness before as-
serting jurisdiction.' 7 The Timberlane court listed seven factors that
courts should consider:
[1.] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
[2.] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations
or principal places of business of corporations,
[3.] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be ex-
pected to achieve compliance,
tion of the ALCOA effects test. In 1977 the Department of Justice adopted the policy
that it should seek to apply United States antitrust laws to an overseas transaction only
when "there is a substantial and foreseeable effect on the United States commerce; and,
consistent with these ends, it should avoid unnecessary interference with the sovereign
interests of foreign nations." See ANTr-TRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN I-
TRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 7 (1977). Commentators believe foreign
hostility to expansive United States notions of extraterritoriality triggered political self-
restraint. See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 18-41.
13 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
14 Id. at 603-05.
15 Id. at 611-12.
16 One commentator has suggested that the jurisdictional rule of reason owes its
"intellectual roots and justification in U.S. law" to the 1965 Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7,
at 25-26. The Restatement lists factors for a court to consider in determining whether or
not to assert jurisdiction:
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforce-
ment actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the terri-
tory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reason-
ably be expected to achieve compliance with the rules prescribed by
that state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
17 549 F.2d at 613.
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[4.] the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared to those elsewhere,
[5.] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce,
[6.] the foreseeability of such effect,
[7.] the relative importance of the violations charged on conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 18
This case-by-case balancing of coimpeting interests to determine the
reasonableness of a court's assertion of jurisdiction is now recog-
nized as the jurisdictional rule of reason. 19
Three years later, the Third Circuit adopted the jurisdictional
rule of reason and further refined it. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp.,20 the court restated the Timberlane factors and added
several additional considerations:
[1.] [a]vailability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litiga-
tion there . . . [,]
[2.] [p]ossible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises
jurisdiction and grants relief. . . [,]
[3.] [i]f relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the po-
sition of being forced to perform an act illegal in either coun-
try or be under conflicting requirements by both countries
...[,]
[4.] [w]hether an order for relief would be acceptable in this
country if made by [a] foreign nation under similar circum-
stances . . . [,]
[5.] [w]hether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the
issue.2 '
A number of commentators have described the jurisdictional
rule of reason as merely an application of comity.22 Others have
noted that the factors constituting the jurisdictional rule of reason
involve much more than mere notions of comity.23 The concept of
18 Id. at 614. The Timberlane court remanded the case to the district court for con-
sideration of these factors. Id. at 615.
19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. One year later, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted its Timberlane test in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406
(9th Cir. 1977). In Wells Fargo, the court explained that, when considering the factors
outlined in Timberlane, the absence or presence of any one factor is not, by itself, deter-
minative of the reasonableness and appropriateness of the extraterritorial application;
the enumerated factors must, on balance, weigh in favor of asserting jurisdiction. Id. at
428-29.
20 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
21 Id. at 1297-98.
22 See, e.g., Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on
Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23
VA. J. INT'L L. 395, 399 (1983); Note, Enjoining the Application of the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act in Private American Antitrust Litigation, 79 MicH. L. REV. 1574, 1599
(1981).
23 See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 148 n.9.
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comity does not lend itself to precise definition.24 It has been de-
scribed as "a blend of courtesy and expedience" 25 and as "neither a
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere cour-
tesy and good will, upon the other."26 Although the "essence ,of
comity is self-restraint," 27 it is a doctrine that commentators have
argued leaves a court great flexibility and little guidance.28 In con-
trast, the jurisdictional rule of reason provides "an absolute (not
merely discretionary) basis for limiting instances of United States
antitrust enforcement that undermines foreign laws and policies." 29
Furthermore, disagreement exists over whether courts should
use the jurisdictional rule of reason to make their threshold jurisdic-
tional determinations or, similar to comity, as an abstention doc-
trine applicable to a later stage of the proceedings. 30 The
resolution of this dispute is not essential, because under either view
the importance of the rule of reason is that it departs from the tradi-
tional doctrine of comity by providing a specific list of factors sensi-
tive to foreign interests to guide the determinations of courts.3'
Critics of the jurisdictional rule of reason argue that it causes
24 See Note, supra note 22, at 1593-94 (suggesting that comity "takes on whatever
shape the exigencies of the moment require").
25 Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st
Cir. 1969).
26 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
27 Note, supra note 22, at 1595.
28 See generally id. at 1593-97.
29 D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 26.
30 See Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (doctrine can be "reviewed as part of the threshold jurisdictional deci-
sion or in connection with a subsequent determination regarding abstention"); Note,
supra note 7, at 155 n.55 (citing supporting authority for both positions).
31 The factors enumerated by the 1965 Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations, and
the Timberlane and Mannington Mills courts are not identical. See supra notes 16, 18, & 21
and accompanying text. A tentative draft of the revised Restatement presents a fourth
alternative list of factors, restating some of those found in the other sources and adding
others:
(a) The extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating
state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law
or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regula-
tion is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or
economic system;




uncertainty in result3 2 and forces courts to consider matters beyond
their competence. 33 Nonetheless, the rule of reason is still widely
regarded as a proper and "constructive" framework for analyzing
extraterritorial assertions ofjurisdiction because it counsels reason-
ableness and thereby moderates the possible insensitivity of extra-
territorial assertions of United States jurisdiction.3 4
B. Transnational Antisuit Injunctions
American courts have the power to enjoin a party from litigat-
ing in another forum, domestic or foreign. Antisuit injunctions are
discretionary: after a party has made the showings traditionally nec-
essary to invoke a court's equitable power, the court considers other
equitable factors that favor or disfavor granting injunctive relief. In
addition, comity may suggest self-restraint. When a United States
court is asked to enjoin litigation in a foreign country, principles of
international comity counsel consideration of the foreign forum's
interests. Until the Laker litigation, however, United States courts
had not openly applied the rule of reason to the question of whether
to enjoin foreign litigation but had relied instead on vague notions
of comity.
1. Background
It is well settled that American courts have the power to enjoin
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 403 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981). These factors are to be considered in determining the reasonable-
ness of the exercise ofjurisdiction, but they are not intended to be comprehensive. Id.
at comment b.
32 As one commentator noted, the uncertainty of result inherent in the rule of rea-
son's balancing tests does not produce "counsellable law" because it fails to provide
foreign business enterprises with a clear picture of their obligations under United States
law. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 7, at 28 (attributing comment to King-
man Brewster).
33 For an extensive but fair discussion of the weaknesses of the rule of reason, see
id. at 26-28. Other critics are less reserved. See Note, Timberlane: Three Steps Forward,
One Step Backwards, 15 INT'L LAW. 419, 425 (1981) (because Timberlane test "calls for
resolution of issues beyond the competence of the courts[,I it fails to clarify relevant
issues and in fact further confuses them"); see also Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterrito-
rialJurisdiction, 31 AM.J. COMp. L. 579 (1983) (courts not proper or effective forum for
balancing foreign policy interests). Courts have also expressed discomfort with the rule
of reason. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (because court is ill-equipped to "balance the vital national interests. . . to deter-
mine which interests predominate . . . the balancing test is inherently unworkable"),
aff'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); accord, National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card
Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
34 See D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON supra note 7, at 28, 86; Note, supra note 7, at
165 n.98 (citing authority in support of rule of reason test).
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a party from litigating in another forum.35 The traditional view is
that such power derives from a court's in personam jurisdiction over
litigating parties properly before it and therefore does not interfere
with the sovereignty of the competing forum.3 6 Courts have the au-
thority to control persons over whom they exercise in personamju-
risdiction and the power to issue an order or decree that binds the
parties even beyond the territorial boundaries of the state.3 7 This
power clearly extends to the enjoining of litigation in foreign coun-
tries.38 That the proceedings to be enjoined are in a foreign forum
is relevant only to the advisability of such action, not to the authority
of the court to so act.39 Because they are extraordinary measures, 40
antisuit injunctions are generally disfavored. 4' Courts particularly
disfavor antisuit injunctions aimed at foreign forums because they
35 See, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890) (antisuit injunctions enjoining
proceedings in another state violate neither full faith and credit clause nor interstate
privileges and immunities clause of federal constitution); Seattle Totems Hockey Club,
Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (federal court may enjoin
party from bringing its compulsory counterclaim in foreign court), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1105 (1982). For an excellent discussion and a comprehensive list of supporting author-
ities, see Note, supra note 22, at 1585-88. For a much earlier discussion of the same
issue, see Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doings ofActs
Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REv. 494, 495-506 (1930).
36 See Note, supra note 22, at 1587; see also Messner, supra note 35, at 495-96.
37 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized both the constitutionality of an-
tisuit injunctions, Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890), and the in personam na-
ture of such relief, Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.S. 278, 291 (1937). See also
Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 427 (1923) ("The proceeding
in the enjoining court is solely in personam .... ).
Several commentators and courts have criticized the in personam basis of an an-
tisuit injunction as a fiction, claiming that in reality such relief interferes with the juris-
diction of another court. See Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981) (in ordinary in personam action one court gener-
ally will not interfere with or try to restrain proceedings in another court), aJ'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 684 (1982); Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 518 F. Supp.
946, 954 (D. Minn.) (injunction would indirectly affect powers of foreign court), aff'd,
664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2942, at 377-78 (1975); Note, supra note 22, at 1587.
38 See Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 116-19 (1890) (if party is resident in one
country, courts of that country may restrain party from bringing suit in foreign country)
(dictum); Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 518 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D. Minn.)
(under equitable powers court can enjoin parties before it from litigating in foreign
country), aft'd, 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Hooker Chem.
Corp., 230 F. Supp. 998, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (same); Note, supra note 22, at 1585-88.
Note, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a Transnational Ap-
proach, 37 STAN. L. REv. 155, 155-56 (1984).
39 See Note, supra note 22, at 1587.
40 E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398
U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, neither is ordina-
rily free to prevent either party from pursuing claims in both courts); Note, supra note
22, at 1588 ("Injunctions are extraordinary remedies .... ").
41 See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 2942, at 377-81 (courts employ
injunctions sparingly); Note, supra note 22, at 1588 (same).
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directly affect the jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign.42 Therefore,
United States courts seldom issue injunctions restraining litigants
from bringing suit in the courts of foreign nations. 43
The decisions of American courts to grant or deny antisuit in-
junctive relief in both the domestic and transnational contexts are
largely governed by traditional equity doctrines. 44 Courts consider
enjoining litigation in other forums only if the party requesting the
injunctive order can meet " 'the usual equitable tests of irreparable
injury and absence of an adequate remedy at law.'-45
Once the power to enjoin is thus established, courts weigh sev-
eral discretionary equitable factors to determine whether injunctive
relief is appropriate. These factors include the enforceability of the
injunction,46 the injustice and unfairness that might otherwise re-
sult,4 7 whether the foreign proceedings sought to be enjoined
would frustrate an important policy of the issuing forum, 48 and the
need to protect the issuing court's jurisdiction. 49 Finally, courts re-
42 Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir.
1969) (transnational antisuit injunctions should be issued "only with care and great re-
straint"). See also Garpeg Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(such measures are disfavored, "especially when an injunction ... is tantamount to en-
joining the tribunal of a foreign sovereign").
43 See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1960)
(injunction against German proceedings denied); Philip v. Macri, 26 F.2d 947 (9th Cir.
1958) (injunction to halt Peruvian proceedings denied). See also Note, supra note 22, at
1585 (courts "sparingly" issue transnational antisuit injunctions).
44 Note, supra note 22, at 1588.
45 Id. (quoting 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4226, at 347 (1978)).
46 See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 2945, at 403 (if injunction unen-
forceable, courts will avoid "futile gesture" of issuing it). See generally Note, supra note
22, at 1590-93 (discussing broad range of practical considerations affecting efficacy of
injunctive relief). The traditional equitable doctrine counseling that a court not issue
unenforceable or impractical orders has led several courts to reject requests for such
injunctive relief. See, e.g., Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (where Hong Kong secrecy law might prohibit intervenor-bank from disclosing
Garpeg's bank records, bank could not enjoin Garpeg, in domestic action, from pro-
ceeding against bank in Hong Kong court).
47 Messner, supra note 35, at 496.
48 See, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 122-23 (1890) (defendant tried to
evade state insolvency law by proceeding in different state); Seattle Totems Hockey
Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981) (policies be-
hind Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)); In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th
Cir. 1970) (foreign court might enforce contract provisions contrary to American pol-
icy), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I
(1972); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn.
1982) (policy of judicial economy); see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37,
§ 2942, at 379 (injunction justified if "the action sought to be halted was instituted to
circumvent some policy or law of the forum state").
49 See, e.g., Omnium Lyonnais D'Etancheite v. Dow Chem. Co., 441 F. Supp. 1385,
1390 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (injunction granted where party abused United States court's ju-
risdiction by using discovered documents to pursue French litigation). See also 28 U.S.C.
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quested to enjoin proceedings in a foreign forum may apply princi-
ples of international comity50 before granting or denying injunctive
relief.51 In this context, comity functions only as an "abstention
doctrine" 52 after the party seeking relief has satisfied the traditional
equitable requirements. Comity in no manner undermines a court's
power to grant transnational injunctive relief, but it may lead a court
to decline to exercise that power.
2. The Current Approach
In deciding whether to issue transnational antisuit injunctions,
United States courts recently have considered traditional equitable
considerations, which focus on fairness to the Parties, but have
glossed over considerations of comity, which focus on the interests
of the foreign forum. In Garpeg, Limited v. United States,53 a United
States federal court was requested to enjoin proceedings in Hong
Kong. The court ruled that foreign litigation should be enjoined
"'when it would (1) frustrate a policy in the forum issuing the in-
junctions, (2) be vexatious, (3) threaten the issuing court's in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction, or (4) where the proceedings prejudice
other equitable considerations.' -54 The "other equitable considera-
tions" to which the court refers would support the issuance of an
antisuit injunction in circumstances where the proceedings in the
competing forum would result in "'unnecessary delay, substantial
inconvenience and expense to the parties and witnesses, and where
separate adjudications could result in inconsistent rulings or a race
§ 2283 (1982) (allows federal courts to stay proceedings in state courts "where neces-
sary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments"). When an action
by a litigant in another forum threatens to paralyze the court's jurisdiction, the antisuit
injunction is often a necessary remedy. Courts have found it necessary to "protect their
jurisdiction" when parties begin potentially vexatious and disruptive litigation in other
forums, see, e.g., Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 856 (adjudicating antitrust claim in both Cana-
dian and United States courts likely to delay case and inconvenience parties and wit-
nesses substantially and unnecessarily ); Cargill, 531 F. Supp. at 715 ("vexatious and
oppressive" foreign action may be enjoined); Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyan-
amid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.) ("We think that the district court has discretion to
enjoin another action in British Guiana on the ground of vexatiousness."), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 964 (1953), or when courts engage in a "race to adjudication," by accelerating
their proceedings, to avert the preclusive res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a
prior judgment, see, e.g., Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 852 ("[S]eparate adjudications could
result in . . .a race to judgment.").
50 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
51 See Note, supra note 22, at 1593-95 (courts may deny injunctive relief on basis of
comity).
52 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
54 Id. at 798 (quoting Cargill, 531 F. Supp. at 715). Several other courts have also
applied the same test. See, e.g., Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 855.
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to judgment.' 55 The court did not list comity as a factor in its
test.
5 6
The Garpeg test reveals that courts faced with requests for trans-
national injunctive relief are concerned with ensuring fairness to the
parties involved and furthering and protecting American policies.
Although it is not included in the test articulated in Garpeg, comity
may play a significant role in courts' decisionmaking. 57 Even if the
issuance of a transnational antisuit injunction serves both to protect
important American interests and ensure fairness to the litigating
parties, considerations of comity may compel a court to take a path
ofjudicial restraint.58 But comity is a nebulous concept that leaves a
court with little guidance and much flexibility;59 commentators have
criticized its effectiveness in limiting courts' discretion in cases in-
volving foreign interests. 60 Because comity does not require a court
formally to consider specific foreign interests, upon request United





Laker Airways Ltd. (Laker) was a British corporation, founded
by Sir Freddie Laker in 1966, that featured a low-fare transatlantic
55 Garpeg, 583 F.Supp. at 798 (quoting Cargill 531 F. Supp. at 715).
56 The Garpeg court denied the request for an antisuit injunction on the grounds
that the matter to be litigated in Hong Kong was not the same as that presently before it
and that there was no likelihood of irreparable harm. Id. at 795. Furthermore, the court
doubted its ability to enforce its order or any rights that the parties had under Hong
Kong law. Id. Because the party seeking an injunctive remedy was unable to satisfy
many of the equitable requirements for injunctive relief, the court never reached the
issue of comity.
57 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Just as the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion limits the power of state courts to enjoin federal proceedings, Donovan v. City of
Dallas, 337 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964), and notions of federalism often restrain federal
injunctions against state proceedings, C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 37, § 2942, at
378-82, the principle of international comity may at times counsel against such relief in
the transnational context. For an excellent discussion of the effect of comity upon the
use of antisuit injunctions, see Note, supra note 22, at 1593-97.
58 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
60 Although comity does implicitly entail the balancing of American and foreign
interests, it "does not demand deference to, or even consideration of every foreign in-
terest," and leaves the question of what factors to weigh entirely to the court's discre-
tion. Note, supra note 22, at 1597.
61 Id. at 1600-01 ("An American court naturally will weigh American more heavily
than foreign interests."). See also Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Firm Corp.,
453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), (foreign executive, legislative, andjudicial acts should
not be recognized if such recognition "would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest[s]
of the nation called upon to give [them] effect"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
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"skytrain" service between New York and London. In 1981 Laker
experienced severe financial difficulties, which, compounded by a
sharp devaluation of the pound, rendered the company unable to
meet its large outstanding debt obligations and forced it into bank-
ruptcy on February 5, 1982.62 On November 24, 1982, Laker, then
in liquidation, filed a $1.7 billion antitrust action under the Clayton
Act in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.63 Laker asserted that several American, British, and other for-
eign airlines conspired to undermine and destroy its business of
providing novel low-fare transatlantic air services. 64 Laker alleged
that the conspirators established a predatory pricing scheme and
pressured Laker's creditors to withhold previously promised financ-
ing necessary for Laker to successfully reschedule its debt
obligations.65
On November 29, 1982, Midland Bank, a British corporation
that had been involved in Laker's abortive refinancing scheme and
thus feared that it might be the target of similar allegations, ob-
tained an order from the United Kingdom's High Court of Justice
enjoining Laker from naming it as a defendant in any United States
antitrust action.66 Shortly thereafter, several of the named defend-
ants, British Airways, British Caledonian Airways, Lufthansa, and
Swissair, filed suit in the United Kingdom's High Court of Justice
seeking a declaration of nonliability and an order permanently en-
62 See Sir Freddie's Creditors Join the Used Aircraft Business, 282 ECONoMIsT 61 (No.
7224, Feb. 13, 1982).
63 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Pan Am. I]. In addition to Pan Am, the defendants in the original
suit included Trans World Airlines, Inc, British Airways Board, British Caledonian Air-
ways, Ltd., Lufthansa, Swissair, McDonnell Douglas Corp., and its subsidiary McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corp. Laker ultimately filed three actions, which were consolidated
before the district court. On February 14, 1983, Laker filed the second suit containing
essentially the same allegations as articulated in the November 1982 complaint, this time
against KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines and Sabena, Belgian World Airlines. In September
of the same year, Laker filed a third such suit naming Union de Transport Aeriens and
Scandanavian Airlines System as defendants. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280, 282 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Pan Am. III].
Laker calculated the $1.7 billion total by alleging $350 million in compensatory
damages, to be trebled under the provisions of § 4 of the Clayton Act, and including
attorneys fees, court costs, and interest. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). In
July 1985 Laker's liquidator settled the suit for $48 million-$8 million of which was
earmarked for Sir Freddie Laker personally on the condition he not pursue any further
litigation against the defendants. Wall St. J., July 15, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
64 Pan Am. , 559 F. Supp. at 1126-27.
65 Id. In June 1983 the Justice Department reportedly began a criminal investiga-
tion into the alleged conspiracy. On November 19, 1984, President Reagan directed the
Justice Department to abandon its inquiry for "foreign policy reasons." N.Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1984, § D, at 1, col. 3.




joining Laker from prosecuting its antitrust claims against them in
United States federal courts.67 The British High Court issued an ex
parte injunction barring Laker from interfering with the British pro-
ceedings aimed at halting his United States antitrust action.68
In March 1983, in response to the order of the British High
Court, Laker obtained an injunction in its United States District
Court suit restraining those defendants that had not yet appeared in
England from taking action abroad that would vitiate or interfere
with the District Court's jurisdiction or Laker's freedom to prose-
cute its United States antitrust claim.6 9 Thus restrained from join-
ing the English proceedings, defendants KLM and Sabena appealed
the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, seeking reversal.70 KLM and
Sabena argued that the district court's order was an abuse of discre-
tion and violated international principles of comity. 7 t
While the KLM-Sabena appeal was pending before the D.C.
Circuit, the British High Court dissolved its earlier injunctive orders
on the ground that jurisdiction was properly before the United
States District Court.72 The British parties took an emergency ap-
peal to the English Court of Appeal where they were granted a tem-
porary restoration of the injunctions pending resolution of their
appeal.73 Before the Court of Appeal ruled on the matter, the Brit-
ish Secretary of State for Trade and Industry invoked the British
Protection of Trading Interests Act (PTIA)74 and issued an order
prohibiting anyone carrying on business in or with the United King-
dom from complying with United States antitrust measures in the
district court.75 The order issued under the PTIA would have made
compliance with discovery requests a criminal offense and would
have had the general effect of frustrating the ability of the United
States courts to fairly and fully adjudicate the case. Laker appealed
this matter to the English Court of Appeal, which concluded that the
PTIA order was within the power of the Secretary of State, and that
its effect would be to render the United States action "wholly untri-
able," inevitably producing a "total denial ofjustice" to the British
67 Id. at 918.
68 Id.
69 Pan Am. I, 559 F. Supp. at 1124.
70 The district court's injunction also applied to the four American defendants-
TWA, Pan Am, McDonnell Douglas, and McDonnell Douglas Finance, Inc.-but these
defendants chose not to appeal. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 921 n.18.
71 Id. at 921.
72 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 1 Q.B. 142.
73 Sabena, 731 F.2d at 918.
74 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
75 See Sabena, 731 F.2d at 919.
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defendants in the United States action.76 Because the British de-
fendants thus could not get a fair trial in United States courts, in
July 1983 the Court permanently enjoined Laker from pressing his
American claims. 77
B. The D.C. Circuit's Opinion
In March 1984, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's as-
sertion ofjurisdiction and its order enjoining KLM and Sabena from
joining the suit in England. Although the court declined to use the
jurisdictional rule of reason to assess the propriety ofjurisdiction, it
expressly balanced specific foreign and American interests in af-
firming the antisuit injunction. In doing so, the court implicitly en-
dorsed rule of reason analysis in the context of transnational
injunctive relief.
Judge Wilkey, writing for the D.C. Circuit, reasoned that both
the United States and British courts had valid grounds for jurisdic-
tion78 and that the conflict arising from their concurrent assertions
of jurisdiction was unavoidable. 79 United States jurisdiction rested
on the principle of territoriality; 80 British jurisdiction was founded
on the nationality principle. 81 Wilkey rejected the jurisdictional rule
of reason,82 considering it unhelpful in resolving the jurisdictional
conflict in this case.83 Noting that courts have rarely accomplished
neutral interest balancing in the jurisdictional context, Wilkey as-
serted that the court was not competent to balance the political fac-
76 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 1 Q.B. 183 (C.A.) (quoted in
Sabena, 731 F.2d at 920).
77 See Sabena, 731 F.2d at 920.
78 Judge Wilkey considered the question of jurisdiction first, reasoning that "[i]f
there is no justification for the court's exercise of jurisdiction, the injunctive relief
should necessarily fail." Id. at 921.
79 Id. at 955.
80 Id. at 922-26. States have prescriptive competence over activities within their
territory. A natural extension of this principle is that states may legitimately prescribe
and regulate conduct that occurs outside a state's territory but that causes harmful ef-
fects within its territorial borders. This notion provides the core of the ALCOA effects
test-the basis for extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws-and
has caused friction between the United States and many other nations. See supra notes
7-11 and accompanying text.
81 Sabena, 731 F.2d at 926. Although some of the allegedly conspiratorial activity
took place in the United States, the thrust of the British jurisdictional claim stemmed
from the fact that Laker and two of the defendants, British Caledonian and British Air-
ways, were all British corporations. A second fundamental tenet ofjurisdictional law is
that a state has the right to control the conduct of its nationals abroad. Id. at 925.
82 See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
83 Because of the conflicting policies behind the United States and British jurisdic-
tional bases, Judge Wilkey described the Laker case as "perhaps the most pronounced
example in recent years of the problems raised by. . . concurrent jurisdiction." Sabena,
731 F.2d at 916.
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tors implicated in this case.8 4 Wilkey also rejected the defendants'
claim that the principle of nationality should be given paramount
status in cases of concurrent jurisdiction.8 5 He concluded that the
jurisdictional conflict could not be resolved, and consequently, be-
cause a legitimate basis for United States jurisdiction existed, it
should be asserted.8 6
Wilkey also found the district court's injunction wholly justified
to preserve the jurisdiction of the court and to protect American
interests.8 7 The court recognized that transnational antisuit injunc-
tions are rarely issued, but decided that when, as in this case, the
injunction is needed to protect valid proceedings already underway
from a similar action aimed at blocking them, the injunction is "de-
fensive" in nature and should be issued.88 Finally, Wilkey noted
that under principles of comity a United States court must give 'def-
erence to foreign proceedings which parallel its own inquiry into the
merits of a case. He held, however, that the English injunctions in
this case were not "parallel," but rather interdictory, and "purely
offensive" in nature.8 9 Consequently, he reasoned, comity did not
restrain a court from issuing a defensive response in the form of an
injunction.90
At the time of the D.C. Circuit's decision, the United States and
British courts seemed to be facing an unavoidable and unresolvable
"deadlock." 9 1 However, in July 1984, the House of Lords reversed
the decision by the British Court of Appeal and dissolved the injunc-
tions protecting the British defendants from the jurisdiction of the
United States courts.92
84 Id. at 948-53. In rejecting the jurisdictional rule of reason Wilkey relied upon
the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in In re Uranium, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill.
1979). Like the Seventh Circuit, Wilkey determined that thejurisdictional rule of reason
would not be useful if the court had to consider "purely political factors which the court
is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing."
Sabena, 731 F.2d at 949.
Judge Wilkey's seemingly emphatic rejection of the jurisdictional rule of reason
must, however, be scrutinized in the context of the Laker litigation. Because the injunc-
tion sought by Laker was necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of the U.S. court, in
shifting the focus of interest balancing analysis to the question of the propriety of in-
junctive relief, the court did in fact use rule of reason analysis to protect its jurisdictional
assertion.
85 731 F.2d at 935 (adoption of such rule would be "entirely novel ... unknown in
national and international law").
86 Id. at 949.
87 Id. at 930-33.
88 Id. at 938.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 945.
92 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 1985 A.C. 58. The House of Lords'
decision of July 1984 did not resolve the initial antisuit injunction obtained against
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C. The District Court's Opinion
The decision by the House of Lords to vacate the injunctions by
no means ended the dispute. Fearing that British Airways and Brit-
ish Caledonian would again attempt to escape United States juris-
diction with the help of the British courts, Laker petitioned United
States District Court Judge Greene for another antisuit injunction
restraining the British airline defendants from once again instituting
proceedings in England.9 3 Noting that the British defendants' past
behavior legitimated Laker's fears and that further interference with
the United States litigation would irreparably harm Laker,94 the dis-
trict court enjoined the British defendants from "taking steps in a
foreign court 'or otherwise' that would impair the jurisdiction of this
Court. . .. "95
Although British Airways and British Caledonian conceded the
competence of the district court and the propriety of its order en-
joining them from proceeding in British courts, the defendants were
concerned about the injunction's broad wording and appealed the
matter for reconsideration by Judge Greene. 96 They argued that the
broad phrase "or otherwise" in the injunctive order would restrain
the defendant airlines not only from bringing suit in England, but
also from communicating with or petitioning their own government
for relief.9 7 Because such a prohibition would extend to Parliament
and all executive agencies, the defendants argued it contravened the
first amendment, 98 standards of international law,99 and principles
Laker by Midland Bank. Although a lower British court dismissed the Midland injunc-
tion on the basis of the House of Lords' action, in July 1985 the Court of Appeal held
that Midland was not "in the same position" as British Airways and British Caledonian
and reinstated the injunction barring Laker from pressing its claim against the bank in
United States courts. The Court held that Midland's banking transactions with Laker
were governed wholly by English law, the bank had no connection with any airlines op-
erating in the United States, and none of the bank's actions was governed by United
States antitrust legislation. Financial Times (London), Aug. 2, 1985, at 27, col. 1.
93 604 F. Supp. at 283-84.
94 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 596 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 &
n.8 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Pan Am. II].
95 604 F. Supp. at 283-84.
96 Id. at 285.
97 Id. at 287.
98 Id. at 286-90. The defendants' claim raised interesting first amendment ques-
tions beyond the scope of this Note. Essentially, the defendants argued that the first
amendment right to petition one's government included the right of British citizens re-
siding in the United States to petition the British government. Id. at 287-88. The de-
fendants also asserted that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which allows antitrust
immunity for the petitioning of governments, extends extraterritorially to prohibit the
court from restraining such activity. Id. For an introductory discussion of both of these
points, see Davis, Solicitation of Anticompetitive Action from Foreign Governments: Should the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Apply to Communications with Foreign Sovereigns?, 11 GA.J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 395 (1981); Note, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and the Petitioning of Foreign
Governments, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1984).
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of comity. 10 0
Although Judge Greene was unimpressed with the defendants'
first amendment claim,10 ' he nevertheless narrowed his order to
preclude only the bringing of suit in England. Greene felt that prin-
ciples of comity counselled such restraint.'0 2 Adopting the rule of
reason as articulated in Mannington Mills, '0 3 the court concluded that
"the interest of Great Britain in the political rights of British sub-
jects" outweighed the competing American interests involved.' 04
The Court also noted that the unlikelihood of any British govern-
mental action lessened the weight of the American interest in pre-
serving its jurisdictional assertion.10 5
III
APPLICATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF REASON
TO THE GRANTING OF TRANSNATIONAL
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The Laker courts' analysis of the appropriateness of transna-
tional injunctive relief departs from the traditional manner in which
courts have dealt with requests for such relief.'0 6 The reasoning un-
derlying the D.C. Circuit's affirmance of the enjoinment of KLM and
Sabena from participating in English proceedings aimed at vitiating
United States jurisdiction reflects a structured consideration of for-
eign interests more closely akin to the jurisdictional rule of reason
than the traditional analytical framework for injunctive relief.'0 7
Moreover, the district court's express use of the jurisdictional rule
of reason 08 in its subsequent decision not to enjoin the British de-
fendants from petitioning their own government for relief is an ex-
plicit step toward the adoption of the rule of reason in the context of
transnational injunctive relief. This trend is laudable; the applica-
tion of rule of reason analysis to determinations of the appropriate-
ness of enjoining proceedings in foreign forums will yield more
reasonable and consistent results than analysis based on vague no-
tions of comity.
99 The defendants contended that the injunctive order would violate human rights
conventions that guarantee the right of free speech, such as the Helsinki Accords. The
court rejected this argument. Pan Am. III, 604 F. Supp. at 290-91.
100 Id. at 291-94.
101 Id. at 287-90; see supra note 98.
102 604 F. Supp. at 291-94.
103 Id. at 292; see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
104 604 F.Supp. at 292-93.
105 Id. at 293-94.
106 See supra part 1B.
107 See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
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A. The D.C. Circuit's Implicit Use of the Rule of Reason
The D.C. Circuit expressly rejected the jurisdictional rule of
reason in approving the district court's assertion of jurisdiction 09
and claimed merely to be applying comity in affirming the district
court's injunction.1 10 However, by seriously and explicitly consider-
ing the interests of the foreign forum, and expressly weighing a fac-
tor identified in the rule of reason as articulated in Mannington Mills,
the court actually analyzed the propriety of the antisuit injunction in
a manner more similar to the rule of reason than to traditional anal-
ysis, which focuses primarily on fairness to the parties and gives
short shrift to considerations of comity. 1im
The court first indicated its departure from the traditional ap-
proach by demonstrating that it intended to give significant weight
to foreign interests. For example, the court stated that equitable
considerations dealing with fairness to the parties alone are not suf-
ficient to "outweigh the respect and deference owed to independent
foreign proceedings."'1 12 In the past such considerations alone have
routinely justified transnational antisuit injunctions; comity has
rarely guided a court to withhold relief. 113 In addition, the court felt
that a transnational antisuit injunction should have "protected" the
district court's jurisdiction only if there was a real danger that the
foreign proceedings would completely destroy the court's "validly
invoked jurisdiction." 114 Mere frustration of jurisdiction by an in-
consistent or conflicting foreign adjudication would not be sufficient
for such relief.115
Although the court clearly was concerned with the American in-
terest in protecting United States commerce from extraterritorial
anti-competitive practices, it did not weigh this interest in a vacuum,
but rather against the British interests involved. The court's consid-
eration of the interests of the competing forum departs from tradi-
109 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
110 Sabena, 731 F.2d at 937-45.
111 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
112 731 F.2d at 929. The court felt that such factors better supported a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 928. For a proposal that the forum non
conveniens inquiry should in large part control the granting of transnational injunctive
relief, see Note, supra note 38, at 175-82.
113 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
114 731 F.2d at 929-30.
115 Id. at 928-29. The court concluded, of course, that it was possible that KLM and
Sabena would attempt to join the British defendants' antisuit injunction against Laker
and thus destroy United States jurisdiction. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying
text. At the time of the court's decision the House of Lords had not yet dissolved the
British injunction. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. In the court's view,
"the English injunction [was] purely offensive," whereas the United States injunction
"was purely defensive" in character. 731 F.2d at 938 (emphasis in original).
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tional injunctive analysis. The British interest in this case, the court
rightly determined, was lessened by the nationality of the parties." 16
Because KLM and Sabena are Dutch and Belgian corporations re-
spectively, British trading interests were not adversely affected. 17
In fact, the court reasoned that retaining KLM and Sabena as de-
fendants actually furthered British trading interests."18
Finally, the court considered the effect on the dispute of the
Bermuda II Treaty,'19 the agreement between the United States and
Great Britain governing air services between the two countries. The
court found it offensive that KLM and Sabena attempted to "ride on
the coattails" of the British airlines under the treaty. The court rea-
soned that whatever immunity from antitrust prosecution the Ber-
muda II Treaty might yield would apply only to the British airline
defendants and not to KLM or Sabena.' 20 Thus, the court found
that the treaty was of little help to the defendants when balancing
the interests of the competing forums. 121
Although the court found the Bermuda II Treaty unavailing to
the defendants, its consideration of the treaty at all implies that the
court's analysis did not end at traditional injunctive inquiry but was
greatly influenced by the rule of reason. Mannington Mills specifi-
cally enumerated consideration of a pertinent treaty with the "af-
fected nation" as a factor for a court to weigh. 122 Thus, by weighing
the impact of the Bermuda II Treaty in its balancing process and by
specifically balancing foreign against American interests, the court
began to extend the rule of reason analysis into the transnational
antisuit injunction context.
B. The District Court's Express Adoption of the
Rule of Reason
Judge Wilkey's opinion for the D.C. Circuit implicitly adopted
the rule of reason analysis, but Judge Greene's subsequent district
116 731 F.2d at 932-33.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 933. The court reasoned that a judgment against a nonBritish defendant
would contribute toward the satisfaction of creditors' claims against a British corpora-
tion, such as Laker, in liquidation. Id. Therefore, retaining KLM and Sabena as defend-
ants could conceivably advance British interests.
119 Id. at 932; see Agreement on Air Transport Services, June 22-July 23, 1977,
United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
120 The British defendants in the case, British Airways and British Caledonian, as
well as the British government, asserted that the terms of the Bermuda II Treaty confer
on them immunity from antitrust liability. No express provision in the treaty has this
effect, and the United States did not accede to this interpretation. Sabena, 731 F.2d at
932 n.75.
121 Id. at 932-33.
122 See supra text accompanying note 21.
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court decision openly embraced the jurisdictional rule of reason in
the context of injunctive relief.123 Confronted with a motion to en-
join the British defendants from petitioning their own government
for relief, Judge Greene expressly weighed the interests of the Brit-
ish government against those of the United States and correctly con-
cluded that the scale tipped in favor of denying relief.' 24
The court decided that comity should control its decision to
grant relief. However, it then listed the factors that the Mannington
Mills court determined should be considered when applying the rule
of reason and stated that they "should generally govern when the is-
sue of international comity is raised in litigation."'' 25 The court thus
did not limit the rule of reason's application to questions ofjurisdic-
tion, but rather expressly used it to determine the appropriateness
of injunctive relief in this case. The court concluded that the impor-
tant British interest of protecting the political rights of its citizens,
including their right to petition their government, outweighed the
United States court's interest in preserving its jurisdiction and pro-
tecting the rights of its litigant.' 26 Applying the rule of reason more
specifically, the court noted that two other Mannington Mills factors,
(1) the foreseeability of the harm to the United States interests and
(2) the effectiveness of an order by the United States court, sup-
ported its denial of relief in this case. 127
The district court's express use of the Mannington Mills test rep-
resents a significant leap from the implicit use of the rule of reason
in the D.C. Circuit's decision. A salutary effect of explicit adoption
of the rule of reason lies in its example for future courts. The im-
portance of formal articulation of a new rule cannot be overstated.
As the Timberlane court noted in formalizing the jurisdictional rule of
reason, the failure to articulate clearly the use of specific factors is
"costly . . . for it is more likely that they will be overlooked or
slighted in interpreting past decisions and reaching new ones."128
123 Pan Am. III, 604 F. Supp. at 292. See also supra notes 103-05 and accompanying
text.
124 604 F. Supp. at 293-94.
125 Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
126 Id. at 292-93. The court did not state which factors in the Mannington Mills list
required this interest balancing, but arguably the first two the court listed command
balancing: "(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) the nationality of
the parties." Id. at 292. Alternatively, the court may have realized that the rule of rea-
son is basically a test that balances specific foreign interests. See supra text accompanying
note 5.
127 604 F.2d at 293 n.57. Finally, the court stated that its confidence that the British
Parliament and executive authorities would not take further action interfering with the
United States proceedings even absent an injunction made denying the requested relief
easier. Id. at 293-94.
128 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612.
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C. Benefits of Applying the Jurisdictional Rule of Reason to
Requests for Transnational Injunctive Relief
The Laker courts' adoption of the jurisdictional rule of reason in
the context of transnational injunctive relief should be perceived as
a positive step.129 The same benefits that flow from the use of the
rule of reason in determining whether to assert jurisdiction also
would derive from its application to requests for transnational in-
junctive relief. United States courts using rule of reason analysis
would render decisions more sensitive to foreign interests and
would thereby encourage foreign courts to act similarly when re-
quested to enjoin United States proceedings and to cooperate in en-
forcing United States judgments abroad. Also, by standardizing a
method of analyzing requests for injunctive relief, adoption of the
rule of reason would help parties plan their litigation strategies and
aid appellate courts in reviewing lower court rulings. Finally, rule of
reason analysis would maximize courts' sensitivity to foreign inter-
ests while preserving consideration of fairness to the parties.
The issuance of a transnational antisuit injunction necessarily
trespasses on the sovereignty of a foreign tribunal.130 Courts' con-
sideration of a list of specifically enumerated factors sensitive to for-
eign interests may lend credence to a decision to enjoin foreign
proceedings. Although the traditional comity doctrine functions as a
potential restraint on a court's ability to grant transnational injunc-
tive relief, it is so flexible and uncertain a concept that its effective-
ness in protecting foreign interests is questionable.1 3 ' The rule of
reason, however, ensures structured consideration of all implicated
foreign interests. A court would still have discretion as to what
weight to afford the various factors, but the factors it must consider
would be nondiscretionary. Hence, in the context of transnational
injunctive relief, the rule of reason may be seen as a form of comity,
which preserves some of the court's discretion but properly protects
foreign interests. Use of the rule of reason thus would diminish the
parochialism and insensitivity that potentially afflict decisions to en-
join foreign proceedings.13 2
Parochial United States jurisprudence insensitive to foreign in-
terests negatively affects American courts and litigants abroad. 33
129 The desirability of such a result is not a foregone conclusion. At least one com-
mentator, urging courts to enjoin the PTIA, has argued that a comparative considera-
tion of competing United States and foreign interests along the lines of the jurisdictional
rule of reason would be both inappropriate and ineffective in the context of injunctive
relief. See Note, supra note 22, at 1598-1601.
130 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 24-28, 59-61 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 11- 12, 60-61 and accompanying text.
133 Foreign backlash to United States courts' use of the ALCOA effects test forjuris-
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The adoption by American courts of rule of reason analysis, incor-
porating consideration of factors such as the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the effect on existing treaty obligations, and
the impact on foreign relations with the affected country13 4 will set a
positive example for foreign courts faced with similar requests in-
volving American interests. Furthermore, because the transnational
recognition and enforcement of American judgments and injunctive
orders depend largely upon discretionary application of comity by
foreign courts, foreign courts must not perceive decisions by Ameri-
can courts as arbitrary and parochial in nature. The adoption of
rule of reason analysis, which is more sensitive to foreign interests
than the traditional comity doctrine, would increase international
respect for and deference to decisions of American courts.
The adoption of rule of reason analysis in the context of trans-
national injunctive relief will inject an element of certainty and con-
sistency into the decisionmaking process involving the use of such
remedies. 135 Balancing tests by their very nature produce unpre-
dictable results. The interest balancing required by the rule of rea-
son, however, will ensure predictability in courts' analysis in a
manner impossible under traditional applications of comity. By re-
quiring consideration of a specific set of enumerated factors, the
rule of reason would not only provide courts with a more definitive
framework for constructing their decisions, but also would aid liti-
gants in assessing the efficacy of various arguments they might put
before the court. Parties could structure their arguments around
the specific factors enumerated in Timberlane and Mannington Mills
and could dispense with the difficult task of guessing what facts or
arguments a particular court might find convincing.
Rule of reason analysis also would facilitate appellate review.
Because the traditional doctrine of comity allows courts much dis-
cretion, appellate review is extremely difficult. Rule of reason analy-
sis would compel trial courts to employ a specific set of factors in
their determinations and provide appellate courts with specific stan-
dards against which to review the propriety of lower court decisions.
Just as the rule of reason would provide a trial court with a frame-
work for determining the propriety of injunctive action, it also
would provide an appellate court with a framework for review.
diction in antitrust cases is an example of such a result. See supra notes 7-11 and accom-
panying text.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 18, 21.
135 The criticism most often leveled at the jurisdictional rule of reason-that it does
not produce "counsellable law" as to the amenability of foreign defendants to United
States jurisdiction, see supra note 32 and accompanying text, is not applicable to deci-
sions regarding the propriety of transnational injunctive relief, which are made after the
adjudication of whether the defendant is amenable to the United States jurisdiction.
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Finally, the rule of reason does not preclude consideration of
equitable factors concerned with fairness to the parties.' 36 Thus,
adoption of the rule of reason would not represent a drastic depar-
ture from traditional analysis governing the propriety of injunctive
relief. Rather, it would combine considerations of the interests of
the litigants and competing forums, along with traditional notions
of equity, in a coherent and efficacious framework. The considera-
tion of equitable factors and factors sensitive to the interests of for-
eign nations makes the rule of reason approach ideal for
determining the fairness and propriety of transnational antisuit in-
junctive relief.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of antisuit injunctions by United States courts in
the Laker litigation represents an important development in the
evolution of transnational antisuit injunctive relief. The Laker
courts' application of the jurisdictional rule of reason in the antisuit
injunction setting is sound and should be followed. At present,
once the traditional equitable showings are made, courts confronted
with requests for transnational antisuit injunctions are restrained
only by the flexible doctrine of comity, the interpretation and appli-
cation of which is left largely to their own discretion. The jurisdic-
tional rule of reason, which specifically requires a balancing of
competing interests, by contrast, would compel United States courts
to consider the specific foreign interests affected by the issuance of
transnational antisuit injunctions.
Uniform application of the jurisdictional rule of reason to re-
quests for transnational injunctive relief would yield several salutary
effects and should be encouraged. First, it would ensure decisions
more sensitive to the interests of the foreign forum and would thus
improve relations between United States and foreign courts. Sec-
ond, it would help ensure consistency in judicial analysis and pro-
vide a more structured framework for appellate review. Finally, it
would continue to maximize courts' fairness to the parties.
Daryl A. Libow
136 The rule of reason, like comity, would function merely as an "abstention doc-
trine," guiding the court's discretion once the traditional equitable showings are made.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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